| Reference re Secession of Quebec | |||||||||
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| Hearing: February 16 - 19, 1998 Judgment: August 20, 1998 |
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| Holding | |||||||||
| Quebec cannot secede from Canada unilaterally; however, a clear vote on a clear question to secede in a referendum should lead to negotiations between Quebec and the rest of Canada for secession. However, above all, secession would require a constitutional amendment. | |||||||||
| Court membership | |||||||||
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Chief Justice: Antonio Lamer |
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| Reasons given | |||||||||
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Unanimous reason by: The Court |
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Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 was an opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the legality, under both Canadian and international law, of a unilateral secession of Quebec from Canada.
Both the Quebec government and the Canadian government stated that they were most pleased with the Supreme Court's opinion, pointing to different sections of the ruling.
Contents |
Following the election of a majority of Parti Québécois (PQ) MNAs with 41.37% of the popular vote in the 1976 provincial election, the party formed a government and, in 1980, held a referendum. The government of Quebec asked the province's population if it should seek a mandate to negotiate sovereignty for Quebec coupled with the establishment of a new political and economic union with Canada. The referendum resulted in the defeat of the sovereignty option with 59.56% voting no on sovereignty. The PQ was nevertheless re-elected in 1981, this time promising not to hold a referendum.
In 1982, the federal government petitioned the Imperial Parliament in London to amend Canada's constitution so that in the future, all further amendments would take place by means of a process of consent involving only the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces (several provinces objected). Up until this point, all amendments had taken place by means of Acts of the Parliament at Westminster, since the Canadian constitution was, strictly speaking, a simple statute of that Parliament.
Colloquially, the switch to a domestic amendment procedure was known as patriation. The particular formula for amendments that was adopted in 1982 was opposed by the then-government of Quebec, which also opposed the adoption of other constitutional changes made at the same time, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—although this opposition was not necessarily based on a rejection of the content of these changes, as opposed to the manner of their adoption, and the failure to include amendments specific to Quebec in the package. Also, Quebec had already at that time a more complete Charter that was adopted in 1975.
Two further attempts were made at amending the Canadian constitution in 1987-1990 and 1992 in a manner that, it was hoped, would have caused the Quebec legislature to adopt a motion supporting the revised constitution. These failed packages of constitutional reforms were known as the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord. Thus, in the mid-1990s, there was a widespread sense that the Constitution of Canada was not fully legitimate, because it had not yet received the formal approval of Québec.
In 1994, the Parti Québécois was re-elected, and announced that it would be initiating a second referendum to take place in 1995. This time, the question was on sovereignty with an optional partnership with Canada. The "no" side won by only a slight margin. Prior to this referendum, the National Assembly of Quebec adopted a bill relating to the future of Quebec which laid out the Quebec's plan for secession in case of a winning referendum.
In response to the bill and the referendum result, several legal actions were initiated by opponents to the independence of Quebec, questioning the legality of secession. In 1996, Parti Québécois leader Lucien Bouchard announced that his government would make plans to hold another referendum when he was confident that the "winning conditions" were there, pointing to the political cost of losing a third referendum. In reaction to Bouchard's stated plans, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien initiated a reference to answer the legality of a unilateral declaration of independence from a Canadian province.
The Governor in Council (effectively, the Cabinet of Canada) submitted the request for an advisory opinion on the following three specific questions:
There were an unprecedented 15 interveners. However, the Quebec government refused to take part and was not represented. In its place the Court appointed André Jolicoeur as an amicus curiae to argue for the sovereignist side.
The federal government's submission argued that the only way a province could secede from Canada would be through a constitutional amendment. Only an amendment through section 45 would allow for unilateral amendments. However, that section does not apply here. To attempt to secede unilaterally would violate the constitution on two grounds. First, it would violate the rule of law by ignoring the authority of the constitution as supreme law of the country, and second, it would violate Canadian federalism by acting with powers only allocated to the federal government.
The amicus curiae's submission argued several points. First, they argued that the reference was invalid; the question is purely a political one and thus is outside the authority of the Court to answer under section 52 of the Supreme Court Act. They attempted to analogize the use of the US political question doctrine to the Canadian constitution. Furthermore, the question is speculative and premature as there are no substantive facts at question. Second, they focused on the second question, claiming that the ability to separate comes from international law. They argued that the "peoples of Quebec" had a right to self-determination under the Charter of the United Nations and thus can secede given the consent of a majority of the Quebec peoples. They further claimed that since there is no international law barring separation then by convention there must be an implied right to do so. Their primary argument was that the doctrine of effectivity gave them authority to secede. That is, recognition of a new state by other countries would validate the separation. They further claimed that the doctrine of effectivity is part of the constitutional convention through its practice in other parts of the commonwealth.
Several aboriginal interveners submitted facta on their right to stay in Canada based on aboriginal treaties and their right to self-determination, further noting that they have already held two referendums where they decided against the separation of the aboriginal peoples from Canada. Their factum attacked the Attorney General's factum on the basis that they completely ignored the role of the aboriginal people within the constitution.
The court addressed the three questions in order. First, they stated that under the Canadian Constitution (and with Quebec being a party to it since its inception), unilateral secession was not legal. However, should a referendum decide in favour of independence, the rest of Canada "would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession." Negotiations would have to follow to define the terms under which Quebec would gain independence, should it maintain that goal. In this section of the judgement they stated that the Constitution is made up of written and unwritten principles (based on text, historical context, and previous constitutional jurisprudence) and that there are four fundamental tenets of the Canadian constitution. Those 4 interrelated and equally important principles or values are:
They held that these pieces cannot be viewed independently but all interact as part of the Constitutional framework of Canada.
The answer to the second question, which concerned Quebec's right under international law to secede, gave the opinion that the international law on secession was not applicable to the situation of Quebec. The court pointed out that international law "does not specifically grant component parts of sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their 'parent' state."
The Supreme Court of Canada's opinion stated that the right of a people to self determination was expected to be exercised within the framework of existing states, by negotiation, for example. Such a right could only be exercised unilaterally under certain circumstances, under current international law. The court held that:
and that
The court stated in its opinion that under international law, the right to secede was meant for peoples under a colonial rule or foreign occupation. Otherwise, so long as a people has the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within an existing nation state, there is no right to secede unilaterally.
The Supreme Court further stated that: Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the federation. The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.
Since the court saw no conflict between Canadian law and International law on the question (neither would allow Quebec to secede unilaterally), it considered it unnecessary to answer the question.
The Quebec government of Lucien Bouchard stated that it was very pleased with the opinion of the Supreme Court. Premier Bouchard stated publicly that the court had validated the referendum strategy that the sovereignists had adopted with René Lévesque. Quebec was most satisfied when the court made it clear that the question of Quebec's political status was above all a political question, and not a legal one. It also liked the fact that the Supreme Court made it clear that the government of Canada and that of the other provinces would have to negotiate after a winning referendum on secession. This would make a unilateral declaration of independence unnecessary.
The Canadian government of Jean Chrétien stated that it was pleased with the court's opinion. The Supreme Court had made it clear that Quebec could not declare independence unilaterally. Any obligation of Canada to negotiate with Quebec was conditional on the sovereignists' asking a clear question within the context of a referendum. The government of Canada subsequently drafted the Clarity Act, which Parliament then enacted.
On July 22, 2010, the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion concerning the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The court had to decide if the declaration did not violate general international law. The court concluded that the unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law, because it was not issued by any official body bound by Serbian or UN administration rules, and international law does not contain a prohibition against declarations of independence.[2]
The unique situation of Kosovo was not discussed nor presented as a reason for the exclusion of Serbian laws (internal law) to analyse the matter. The court stated that only general international law applies to the situation of a unilateral declaration of independence. The court also stated that a referendum was not required.[3]
However, the ICJ's opinion did not directly relate to Reference re Secession of Quebec, because the former only addresses the ability of a private body to issue a declaration; whereas the Supreme Court's opinion on Reference re Secession concerns the ability to actually effect secession, which is a legal issue.